

7. Trade in Africa 54,

A

DETECTION

OF THE

FALSE REASONS AND FACTS,

Contained in the Five LETTERS,

(ENTITLED,

Reasons for keeping GUADALOUPE at a *k*
Peace, preferable to CANADA; From a
Gentleman in GUADALOUPE to his Friend in
LONDON.)

IN WHICH

The ADVANTAGES of both CONQUESTS are *fairly* and
impartially stated and compared.

By a MEMBER of Parliament.

L O N D O N :

Printed for THOMAS HOPE, facing the *North-Gate* of
the *Royal-Exchange*, in *Thread-needle Street*.

MDCCLXI.

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DEBATE
OF THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS AND FACTS

Concerning the Slave Trade

1793

Printed for Knapton, Stationer, in Pall Mall, London.



Printed by J. Knapton, Stationer, in Pall Mall, London.


By Order of the House of Commons.

LONDON.

Printed by J. Knapton, Stationer, in Pall Mall, London.

1793

[Printed by J. Knapton, Stationer, in Pall Mall, London.]



A

DETECTION, &c.

* * * * * HERE has lately appeared an *exotic*
* * * * * Production, intituled, *Reasons for keep-*
* * * * * T * * * * * ing GUADALOUPE preferable to CANA-
* * * * * DA, in five Letters, dated from Gua-
daloupe, and recommended to the
Public, with Abundance of Self Commendation
for Veracity and particular Knowledge of the
Countries in Question; especially of the Island
of *Guadaloupe*; and for the Author's Abilities to
reason upon such an important Subject, from
Ancient History and Natural Philosophy.

But, there appear visible Marks of Falshood
and Deception, of Ignorance and Arrogance in
every Letter, and almost in every Page. By
which I hope to convince you, That the Author
of those Letters is not sufficiently acquainted
with, and perhaps never was upon, the Island of
Guadaloupe: That he is totally ignorant of *Nat-
ural Philosophy*: That his Reading in *Ancient
History* is trifling, and his Applications thereof
absurd and ridiculous: That his *Facts* are false,
and his *reasoning* sophistical, and that his *personal
Reflections* are unjust, scandalous, and ill becom-
ing the Pen of a *Gentleman*, as the Author styles
himself.

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As

As this Letter-writer lays great Stress upon his residing in *Guadaloupe*, in order to gain the more Credit for the Facts he advanceth; it is very proper to observe, That his Letters refer to certain Pamphlets, which were not then published in *London*, when he pretends to answer them at *Guadaloupe*. This Circumstance carries all the Marks of an *Apocryphal* Writing; and is enough to induce a Belief of its being the Composition of an ignorant Pretender to discuss a Point, of so great Importance to the Honour and Interest of GREAT BRITAIN.—If this be a Fact; what Credit does such an Author deserve, in other Particulars? He assumed the Name of a Gentleman at *Guadaloupe* to gain our good Opinion of his Integrity and Knowledge of those Things, he had to write, concerning the Value and Produce of that Island*: Therefore, that good Opinion must cease, when it is shewn, That he has no Right to that Name.

This premised, we enter into the *Merits* of this Writer. He undertakes to prove, That the Island of *Guadaloupe* is an Acquisition preferable to *Canada*; and that *Guadaloupe*, at a Peace, ought to be kept, and *Canada* restored to the *French*.

The Nature of his Argument is to persuade the Readers, that they, who prefer *Canada* to *Guadaloupe*, are influenced by *private Views*†: an *Innuendo*, which this Gentleman keeps up with such Freedom, throughout his Performance, as if his whole Business was to Spirit up a Dislike, in the People, to the *Sugar Planters, Proprietors,* and

* See Page 68. Line 6, &c. Page 77. Line 33. Page 78. Line 1, &c. Page 79. Line 8.

† Page 3.

and *Merchants* * ; amongst whom he enumerates many Members of Parliament, capable of co-operating with *French* Schemes † ; and to stigmatize the Writers in Favour of *Canada*, with the base Imputation of inlisting themselves in the Cause of *France* against *Great Britain* § ; concluding with a Declaration, “ That he has wrote not
 “ with much Partiality, nor is he animated with
 “ any Sallies of Passion or Prejudice ; but has
 “ given a plain Narration of Facts, and the
 “ clear natural Consequences, that follow from
 “ those Facts ||.”

Aspersions of this delicate Nature ought to be supported by undeniable Facts, or the Public will treat them, as the Effects of private and personal Rancour, thrown out by way of Revenge for an *imaginary* Injury received from the upright and steady Conduct of some Members of Parliament, Merchants or Proprietors in the *Sugar Trade*.

How has this Author acted in the Case before us ? He represents the Proprietors of the *Sugar Islands*, that reside at *London*, and the Sugar Merchants in *Liverpool* and *Bristol* (many of whom sit in Parliament) dreading *Guadaloupe*, as a *Rival to their private Interest, and hurtful to their Fortunes*. This opulent and respectable Body, he has the Assurance (*without any Sallies of Passion*) to call *Wolves in Sheep's Cloathing* †, and *false, unnatural, and corrupt Children*, “ prostituting their
 “ Eloquence and Persuasion to the Destruction

B 2

“ and

* Page 8. Line 16, &c. Page 13. Line 9, &c. Page 15. Line 23, &c. Page 24. Line 28. Page 26. Line 1. Page 30. Line 7, &c. Page 33. Line 12. Page 34. Line 19, &c. Page 36. Line 17, &c. Page 37. Line 30, &c.

† Page 61. Line 20, &c. Page 62. Line 14, &c. Page 65. Line 12, &c. Page 68. Line 21.

§ Page 74. Line 1, &c.

|| Page 79.

‡ Page 36.

“ and Ruin and Murder of the Mother, who
 “ gave them Birth *.” But does not, and knows
 very well that he cannot, give one Example in
 Confirmation of such a heavy Charge.

For, the Gentlemen in the Administration, to
 whom the Nation is indebted for their wise, vi-
 gorous and disinterested Measures, can attest,
 That the *Sugar Gentlemen* were so far from con-
 sidering the Conquest of *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe*
 to be injurious or hurtful to their Trade and pri-
 vate Fortunes, that these very Proprietors and
 Merchants have always advised and favour'd the
 taking of those Sugar-Islands from the *French*.
 And when that Advice was carried into Action,
 it is well known, that the Expedition met with a
 chearful and ready Assistance from the *English*
 Sugar-Islands; not only in their public Capacity,
 but from several private Gentlemen, who entered
 Volunteers to encourage and to complete the Re-
 duction of *Guadaloupe*.

These are Facts sufficient to wipe off the gla-
 ring Misrepresentations of that selfish Opposition,
 so maliciously and undeservedly laid to the Charge
 of the Proprietors, Merchants and others, con-
 cerned principally in the Sugar-Trade.—For, had
 they conceived any *Rivalship* in Trade from a Re-
 duction of the *French* Sugar-Islands to the Crown
 of *Great Britain*, they could never have acted so
 inconsistently with their *private* Interest; and what
 Influence they might have in public Affairs, it is
 reasonable to suppose, they would have exerted,
 to dissuade, obstruct and prevent that national
 Measure.

As these Sugar-Gentlemen have behaved quite
 otherwise, it is a Specimen of the most abandon'd
 Scurrility,

Scurrility, and of the greatest Want of Shame, in those, who endeavour to fix upon them the odious Character above-mention'd, and must convince the impartial and true *Briton*, that they do not look upon *Guadaloupe*, as a *Rival to their private Interest*; nor attempt to lessen its Value from any *private Views* whatever.

His next Care is to ingratiate Himself; and to persuade, That he delivers Facts, not as communicated; but *upon his own Knowledge*. — He * lays great Stress upon “his living upon the Island “ of *Guadaloupe* for about a Year, attentively “ observing every Circumstance he mentions.” Daily conversing with the People of most Knowledge in those Branches of Trade—And then triumphantly appeals to the Reader, *now, which of our Accounts are to be most credited? This by me, or that by Gentlemen, who were never upon the Island.*

As this Appeal is intended by the Letter-Writer to be a Criterion, for the Reader to judge of the Author's Veracity, in relating of Facts, concerning the Produce, Improvement, Exports, and other peculiar Advantages, he is pleased to ascribe to *Guadaloupe*; I doubt not of being able to shew, That his Ignorance of those Particulars will deprive him of this Pretence, in the Opinion of every candid and intelligent Reader; and that *Guadaloupe* never did, nor ever can produce the Quantity of Sugar, which this Author has raised, within the Space of one Year, by his own fertile Imagination.

He describes *Guadaloupe* able to furnish as much Sugar, Cotton, Rum and Coffee, as ALL the Islands, we have, put together; and to consume a vast Quantity of *British* and *American* Produce; besides

sides great Expectations from the Cultivation of the genuine *Cinnamon-Tree*; of which Spice he avers, there have been Samples sent Home to *England*, as good as any the *Dutch* have *. The Quantity of Sugar, which he affirms this Island can yield, he estimates at 150,000 hogsheads †, and roundly asserts that “when the *French* had “but few People, who understood the Culture “of the Sugar Plant, and not half sufficiency of “Negroes to work the Ground, *Guadaloupe* exported 70,000 hogsheads of Sugar annually §.” That “*Guadaloupe*, including *Grand Terre*, is of “much larger extent than *Martinico*, and productive of more Sugars, and that there is as “much good Land free of Mountains in *Guadaloupe*, as the whole Extent of *Martinico*, “Mountains and all included. That *Marie Galante* is very near the Extent of *Antigua* to a “Trifle, without a single Mountain in it; very “capable of producing Sugar, and abounding “with the best Coffee and Cotton of any of our “Islands, of which millions of Pounds have been “sent to *Britain*, since it was in our Possession. “And that the Exports of this Island to *Britain* “and *America* have been as great, as any Island “*Britain* has ||.”

In this descriptive Argument we are to consider, how far it is consistent with *Geography*, *Natural History*, and with the *Accounts* of the *Custom-House*: For should it come out, That *Guadaloupe* can neither in Extent of Land, nor in the *Nature* of its *Soil*, be capable of producing as much Sugar as ALL our Sugar Islands put together; and that

* See Page 7. 22, and may in a few Years be sufficient to serve *Britain* and *Ireland* much cheaper than the *Dutch* do at present, Page 66.

† Page 12, 23.

§ Page 23,

24, 6 7.

|| Page 66, 67.

that the Account of its *Exports* never amounted to any Quantity similar to this Gentleman's Sum of 70,000 Hogsheads annually; he must be despised, either as an Imposture, for affirming of his own Knowledge, what he is entirely ignorant of; or, as one voluntarily engaged in a Design to misrepresent and to misguide with notorious Falshoods.

As to Extent of Land; tho' it might with Propriety intitle me to produce the Admeasurement of ALL the *British Sugar Islands*, in Opposition; because this Author so roundly affirms *Guadaloupe* to be productive of more Sugars than them *all*, I will content myself with a bare Comparison between the Extent of Lands in the Island of *Jamaica* only, and in the Island of *Guadaloupe*.

According to the best received *geographical* Accounts, the Island of *Jamaica* lies East and West, 140 Miles long, and 60 Miles broad; which, without taking the Elevation of the mountainous Parts, measures 8400 square Miles. Land sufficient, without any Addition of Territory, to supply Sugars, not only for the *British*, but for all the *European* Markets; was it practicable to cultivate all the Ground for such a Use.

But the Island of *Guadaloupe*, properly so called, measures no more than 66 Miles long, and 30 broad, at the Extremities, being very narrow in the middle; where the two Parts join in Points like two Hats cocked. So that, allowing this Island a full square Measurement, it would not contain more than 1980 square Miles: And should we indulge the Advocate for *Guadaloupe* with the Addition of the Dimension of *Marie Gallante*, the neighbouring Island, that fell with her under the *British* Government, and measures 15 Miles in Length, and
about

about 12 Miles in Breadth, containing 180 square Miles; together no more than 2160 Miles, there will be 6240 square Miles of Land less in *Guadaloupe* and *Marie Gallante*, than in the Island of *Jamaica*. So that this Gentleman's Argument can't be prov'd by Extent of Land; and he is either a very great Stranger to the *Geography* of this Conquest, or he wilfully exaggerates, when he boldly declares, That *Guadaloupe* can furnish more Sugar, &c. than ALL the *British* Sugar Islands put together.

Well! but perhaps the Difference is to be sought for in the *Climate*, in the *Soil*, and in the *Culture* of the Land. To prove this, the Gentleman gives us an accurate Specimen of his *Philosophical* Genius.—He recommends the Fertility of *Guadaloupe* in *Sugars*; for its having as much good Land free of *Mountains*, as the whole Extent of *Martinico*, *Mountains* and all included; and cries up *Marie Gallante*, for the same Uses of producing Sugar; because it has not one single *Mountain* in the whole Island*.

It might be expected that a Writer, who assures us, “that he has considered this Point with Attention,” that he himself has been thought, by the Sugar Planters in our Islands, *not defective in the Knowledge of Vegetation and Culture of the Ground*; and that many of the best Sugar Planters, who have looked over *Guadaloupe* carefully and attentively, gave it their Opinion, that his estimate is considerably below the Produce†; would have advanced nothing, which could not stand the Test of the severest Disquisitions into the *Natural History* of this Island and its Appendage. Whereas his own Words, on which he lays the greatest Stress in this Argument, make directly against

* See Page 66.

† Page 23. and Page 67.

against him, and at once prove that he is *defective* in the Principles of *Vegetation*, that he has not rightly considered the Subject, and that his Estimate can receive no Advantage from the *plain Face*, for which he takes upon him to recommend the Fertility of *Guadaloupe* and *Marie Galante*, in the Produce of Sugars. For, Nature and Practice confirm that a Country or Island *without Mountains* are, in no wise, the most abounding in Sugars.

Without sufficient and proper Moisture there can be no *Vegetation*. It is no less certain that Countries, and even Parts of Countries, and of Islands, removed far from Mountains, are in Want of necessary Moisture for the Cultivation, particularly, of the *Sugar Cane*: For, *Mountains* are accounted by Naturalists, as so many natural Alembic Heads, which condense the Vapours into Clouds, and so, by a Kind of external Distillation, give Origin to Springs and Rivers; and by amassing, cooling and constringing them, turn those Vapours also into Rain to refresh, and assist in the Production of the Fruits of the Earth.

This is manifest to those, who are the least acquainted with the Works of Nature. This is the Case of *Egypt*; it has no Rain, because there are *no Mountains* near enough to send that Blessing; it is providentially supplied by the periodical Inundation or Overflowing of the River *Nile*, which springs in Mountains many hundred Miles removed. The like is found at *Lima*, on the South Continent of *America*, and in many other plain Countries, both on this and the other Side of the Line: Nay, we need not seek for Examples at a greater Distance than the Southern Parts

of *France*, and in *Spain*. Here Want of Rain is entirely owing to this natural Cause; their great Distance from the Mountains. And in the Vales or Lowlands, known by the Names of *St. Jago de la Vaga* and *Withy Wood*, on the Island of *Jamaica* (tho' as good Land as any upon the Island, for forty Miles together) they have never been able to cultivate the Sugar-Cane to any Advantage; for Want of Rain, owing to their Situation too far from the Mountains.

Therefore this Author exposes both himself and his Cause to publick Censure, by risking his Knowledge in *Vegetation* and *Culture* of the *Sugar Cane*, and the *Fertility* of *Guadaloupe* in *Sugars*, upon so weak, so erroneous, and so Self-convicting a Proof, as to prefer this Acquisition to ALL the *British Sugar Islands*, for its Produce of *Sugars*, on Account of its being by far *less Mountainous*.

However, this Gentleman has a Fact in *Peyto*, which proved, might bring him off with Reputation, and convince us, That *Guadaloupe* is as fruitful in *Sugar*, as he has represented that Island—
 “ I have lived, says he, on the Spot, in *Guadaloupe*, for some Time; so from some Intimacy
 “ with the *Custom-House* and *Naval-Office*, I have
 “ had more Opportunities to know the *Export* and
 “ *Import* of this Island, than any Body who hath
 “ yet written on the Subject; both what it hath
 “ produced, and what it can produce *.” And, on the Strength of this bold Push for Credit, he advances, That *Guadaloupe* can produce 150,000 Hogsheads of *Sugar* †. That in its weakest State, and early Manufacture of *Sugars*, it annually exported 70,000 Hogsheads to *France* § :
 And

* See Page 14. † Page 12 and 14. Page 67. § Page 23. 24.

And “ That the Exports of this Island to *Britain* and *America* (since its Reduction) has been as great as any Island *Britain* has *.

Here we are to observe, That should it be made appear that the *Exports* of this conquer'd *French* Island are much under this Author's Calculation, there must be a total Eclipse of his Veracity: And should it be found that *Guadaloupe* never exported 70,000 Hogsheads, at any Period of Time, to *France*; and that her *Exports* to *Britain* and *America* fall very short of what has been exported from a *British* Islands; it must be confessed that there is no Truth in him, tho' he has taken so much Pains to gain our Belief.— For, to retort his own Words †, “ Facts are “ stubborn Things: They will neither bend to “ the Force of Faction and private Views, nor “ will they yield to Sophistry and Eloquence.”

From what has been observed upon the *Extent* and *natural* State of the Land in *Guadaloupe*, I shall rest my Argument against the Possibility of raising 150,000 Hogsheads of Sugar on that Island, and its Dependencies. He refers to the *French* Records for Proof of its yielding 70,000 Hogsheads; but he neither ascertains the Weight of each Hogshead, which, with us, is at least 1000 Pounds-weight, and frequently 1500 Weight, whereas the *French* seldom pack up more than 500 Pounds-weight of Sugar in their Casks. Nor does he give us any Extract from those Records, or shew where they are to be had and examined. This is certain, that *Guadaloupe* and its Dependencies have not exported one-third of 70,000 Pounds-weight to *Britain* and *America*, since its
C 2 Reduction

* See Page 67.

† Page 14.

Reduction to the *British* Crown ; which sinks the Value far below some of the *British* Sugar Islands : For, *Jamaica* alone, in last Year, exported to *Britain* 60,000 Hogsheads of Sugar, of 1000 Pounds-weight each : That *Martinico* is known to be the most fruitful of any of them in Sugar ; occasion'd by its Mountains, from which the Land is well water'd by numerous Rivulets : That *Granada*, an Island 25 Leagues in Circumference, produceth good Crops of Sugar : That the Increase of the *French* Property on the Island of *Hispaniola*, otherwise call'd *St. Domingo*, about 420 Miles long East and West, and 120 Miles broad North and South, has greatly improved the Sugar Manufacture under the *French* Dominion ; and that the *French* have spared no Pains nor Expende to enlarge their Sugar Trade in every Island they possess among the Caribbees.

Now allowing to each Island as follows, *viz.*

	Hhds.
To Hispaniola.	40000
Martinico.	40000
Granada.	10000
All others together.	5000
	<hr/>
	95000
There will remain for <i>Guadaloupe</i> and its Dependencies no more than	} 25000
	<hr/>
Total Produce of <i>French</i> Sugars . . .	120000
	<hr/>

And for the Proof of this Estimate, I appeal to the *French* Account of their Sugar Trade ; and to their great Attention for its Improvement ;
who

who certainly employ'd every Art and Penny, that was necessary to cultivate Sugar Plantations, and can't therefore be thought so neglectful of their favourite Scheme and Interest on the Island of *Guadaloupe*, as to let the Land lie idle, when it was capable of producing 150,000 Hogsheads of Sugar annually.—Such are the Errors in Computation, and the Absurdities of those Facts, which are published by a Faction to serve private Views.

But, says the Letter-Writer, This Island of *Guadaloupe* excels all the *British* Isles in the Produce of the *true genuine Cinnamon*; of which Samples have been sent to *England*, as good as any the *Dutch* have, and adds, upon his Affirmation, “ that this Island could in a few Years serve all *Britain* and *Ireland* with *Cinnamon*, and *all other Countries* soon after, cheaper than the *Dutch* do at present *.

That the *true genuine Cinnamon* may be found on the Island of *Guadaloupe*, is not worth my while to contend: But that its Production is *peculiar* to this Island amongst all the *Caribbees*, and that *Samples* thereof have been sent to *Britain*, are *Facts* that want Confirmation.—If the *true genuine Cinnamon* will grow in *Guadaloupe*, then, according to just Observation, it will grow in other Islands within the same Climate, and similar in their Soil; amongst which *Jamaica*, rich in the *Pimento*, exported from thence in great Quantities, bids fairest for cultivating the *genuine Cinnamon* (could it once be found upon any of its Sister Islands). So that there can be no Argument built upon this Discovery, to shew the Necessity for keeping *Guadaloupe*, for the Sake of its *Cinnamon Plantations*.

* See Page 7. 66.

Plantations. But to detect this Author more clearly: All his Boasting on this Discovery of *Cinnamon* in *Guadaloupe* is founded upon *Seven Pounds* of a Spice, *not so good as Cassia*, sent from thence to a certain Merchant in *London*.

Hitherto, I have confin'd the Argument to such Facts, which the Letter-Writer pretends to relate to the Public, from his own Knowledge of those Things he advanceth, in Favour of the Importance of *Guadaloupe* to *Great Britain*. I am not conscious of having misrepresented any of his Assertions; or of not giving his Arguments their due Weight. But I have searched him out, and detected his Impostures, by shewing, from the strongest Circumstances, "That he did not write those Letters as they are dated, from *Guadaloupe*," that he is an ignorant Pretender to the Knowledge in the *Cultivation* of *Sugars*, and that he greatly magnifies the *Produce* of Sugar on that Island.

In the next Place I shall consider his Reasons in Favour of *Guadaloupe*; and trace out his general Arguments for keeping that Island in preference to *Canada* on the Continent of *North America*.

His Argument is thus form'd: "The Consumption of Sugar is daily increasing both in *America* and *Europe*, and is become one of the Necessaries of Life*: But we cannot at this Day serve ourselves of that Article†. Therefore it is the particular Interest of *Britain* to increase the Number of her Sugar-Islands‡."

The great Consumption of Sugar, and its Necessity, will not be disputed. But it is absolutely denied,

* See Page 5, 6.
Line 9, and 10.

† Page 8. Line 2.

‡ Page 8

denied, That our Sugar-Islands *cannot* serve their Mother-Country with that Article.

To prove a Scarcity the Letter-Writer roundly affirms : “ That *Jamaica* has not increased in Sugars, these thirty Years past, and never can increase much ||.”

Had this Author been the least acquainted with the State of our Sugar-Islands, particularly of *Jamaica*, he must have known that *Jamaica*, within these *thirty Years*, has increased its Sugar to almost *double* the Quantity; that it rose last Year 10,000 Hogsheads at least; that its Lands, *productive of Sugar*, are sufficient to supply all the *European* Markets with that Necessary of Life; that the Plantations, now settled in *Jamaica*, could *double* their Quantities of Sugar, had they *Strength* to cultivate them; that there is not one *tenth Part* of this Island cultivated, for Sugar; that the first Settlers on this Island planted the Cane in the Centre, in Mountainous Parts of the Island, for their own Security against Enemies, that might annoy the Sea Coast, and as the properest Situation and Land for the Growth of Sugar, which is a succulent Plant and requires much Rain (as noted above) tho’ this Pretender to *Natural Philosophy* alledges, that the greatest Part of this Island, *being Mountainous*, it is not capable of Culture, and cannot answer in many Places the Expence of carrying the Sugars over Mountains * to be shipp’d: and he must have also known, that the Defect in Cultivation is not owing to any Want of Inclination and Diligence in the Land Proprietors, who must be supposed willing to make the best Advantage of their Estates, by cultivating a Marketable Commodity; but that it must be ascribed to the

the vast Burthen laid upon Sugar, and the excessive Increase of Price for Slaves; viz. *Fifty-four Pounds* for a *raw* Negroe, and *Ninety Pounds* apiece for *seasoned* Negroes.

It is granted that many People from *Ireland* and *Britain* would have settled in our Sugar-Islands † had they not been necessitated to go to the *Dutch, Danish, French, and neutral* Islands, by the many Discouragements, and high Impositions, which have been continued and laid on of late Years, and *not* for want of Territory, or good Land to work upon. For, *Jamaica* gives Lands, and has expended very large Sums, as the Ministry well knows, in Bounties, to bring over and to establish *new Families* and *Sugar Manufactures*; without being able to meet with Success equal to their public Spirit: it being more advantageous for them to settle in *neutral, Danish, &c.* Islands, where there are *no Taxes* to be paid out of their Produce and Labour, than under a Dominion where their Manufactures are continually loaden with Impositions, in Proportion to their Success in Trade.

By this Time, I hope, it is Self-evident, That there is *no Want of Territory* for the Increase of Sugar to serve ourselves of that Article.

But this is again disputed by a Fact, which this Letter-Writer advances, of the Importation of 14,000 Hogsheads of Sugar into *Ireland* from *Portugal* *, and other Places *annually*, from a Want of that Commodity of our own, at the breaking out of the present War.

A most extraordinary Assertion! All Sugars pack'd up by the *Portuguese* is done, not in Hogsheads, but in Chests: which creates great Suspicion,

cion, that all wrote on this Head by the Gentleman at *Guadaloupe*, is no more than a Sally of his confused Imagination; and deserves no further Attention. To convince the World that the *British Islands* make Sugar sufficient for our own Consumption, Let the *Custom-House Accounts* of the *Exports* be consulted; and it will appear, by those Accounts, that not less than 20,000 Hogheads of *British* Sugar have been exported, in every Year to foreign Markets, since the War: So that, till it can be more evidently made out that the *British* Sugar-Islands are not in a Capacity to supply the Market, and to be improved, we must reject all Proposals and Arguments for increasing their Number: nothing being more certain, than that we have more Sugar-Lands, than there are People to cultivate them, and that all Measures tending to divide and disperse our Sugar-Colonies will be injurious to *Great Britain*, and to the Sugar Trade of this Nation.

Unwilling to yield to the Voice of Reason, this Author tries to inforce his Argument still further, by insinuating the Danger of a *Monopoly* of this Manufacture * amongst the Parties concern'd in the Sugar Trade.

Should we admit the Possibility of a *Monopoly*, which by no Means can be granted; let me premise one plain Question; Would the Addition of *Guadaloupe*, or any other Sugar-Island, prevent that *Monopoly*? Does Self-denial and Public Spirit rule the Market of our Enemy's Sugar-Colonies more than our own? is there a considerable Profit to be acquir'd by such a *Monopoly*, and can it be supposed, if practicable, that the Proprietors, &c. of that Trade, in our conquer'd Colonies of Su-

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* See Page 6, Line 7. Page 13, Line 26.

gar, would not readily and cordially enter into the same Measures to mend their Fortunes? Then, what can this Author infer from such an Allegation, That the Sugar Planters have made a Monopoly for themselves of that Commodity, of a long Time past?

But, it is impossible for the Planters to make a *Monopoly* of that Trade: the Necessities of most of them will always force their Goods into Market, and oblige them to sell to the best Bidder: and the insurmountable Difficulty of combining amongst the Rich, whose Property lies, in some Parts, a *thousand Miles* asunder, and whose Correspondence centers only in *Europe*; there being no Passage or Communication regularly to be depended upon, because of the Winds, will always prevent the Effects of Schemes to engross the Sugar Trade, could it be supposed, that they were *all* inclined to advance their Fortunes by an *illicit* Trade: which is a Supposition too ungenerous for a disinterested Writer to insinuate.

The only Danger, therefore, of a *Monopoly* of Sugar in *Britain*, is to be sought for amongst those, who lie in wait to beat down the Value or Price set by the Planters upon their Commodity; and to lock it up, till an Opportunity may serve to parcel their Sugars out, at an extraordinary Advance upon the Public; a Danger not to be avoided, nor remedied by the Increase of Sugar Plantations: and scarce to be fear'd; since Sugar is now as reasonable in *England*, as in other Countries.

But, to dismiss so weak a Branch of the Gentleman's Argument, I appeal to the Merchants in the Sugar Trade for the Cause of the high Price, that is now upon Sugars. They will tell you and

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can prove, That it is not owing to a *Scarcity* nor from a *Monopoly* of that Commodity; but from the vast *Burthens* imposed upon Sugars. And, if that be the Case, as might be made appear, no new Acquisitions in Sugar-Islands, be they ever so extensive, well cultivated and fruitful in that Produce, can reduce the Price: For, as those new Sugars must be imported into *Britain* under the same Restrictions, Imposts, and Expences, the Planter, being disabled by *high Duties* and *increased Charges*, will falter in his Cultivation of the Sugar Cane. This has always been the Case where either Sugar, or any other Product has sold very cheap. Whereas, on the contrary, the Planter and Farmer will strain every Sinew to make a larger Produce of a Commodity, which, by its Dearness, promises a large Profit.

Without attending to this necessary Point; at which we are to seek the grand Obstacle to the Increase and Cheapness of Sugars, the Letter-Writer, insists that our Property in the *Sugar-Islands* is a great deal too little*. Tho' this, and all he argues, about Extent of Territory†, is answer'd by the Premises, which shews that no Increase of the Sugar-Plantations can lessen the Price of Sugars in *Britain*, without they be disburthened from those extraordinary Incumbrances, to which they are now subject; I will observe further, that there can be no Prospect of a Deficiency in Sugars, nor any Reason to suppose we have too few, by a great deal, of Sugar-Islands, when all, that understand any thing of the Nature of the Soil and Climate for the Cultivation of Sugars, and of the Extent, and Situation, and Condition of *Jamaica*, will support my Assertion, That *Jamaica* ONLY is

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capable

* See Page 6, Line 16. † Page 11, Line 30.

capable of supplying not only *Britain* and her Dominions, but all *Europe* with Sugars of her own Growth, notwithstanding it is affirmed, That exclusive *Guadaloupe*, our Sugar-Islands can't serve the Consumption of *Great Britain* and *Ireland* by 10,000 Hogsheads a Year (page 58.) and *America* must have as much as *Britain*; either forgetting or not knowing that *England* last Year exported 20,000 Hogsheads to the Continent, and had no want for Home Consumption.

Now allowing *Guadaloupe* all its pretended Merit, it is evident " That an Addition of this Territory is not wanted: " That it would be bad Policy to supplant the Cultivation of the *British* Sugar-Islands, properly so called, for the Advantage of a conquer'd Territory: " That the present high Price of Sugars is not the Effect of *Scarcity*; but of the heavy Burthens, by which the Sugar Trade is incumbered: " And that the Reader may frame a better Judgment of the Real Value of *Guadaloupe* upon these Facts, than by a thousand sophisticated and evasive Treatises, as those are, which appear in Favour of *Guadaloupe*, in Opposition to *Canada*, and the Acquisition of Territory in *North-America*, and in Prejudice to our Sugar-Islands; when Subtilty and Resentment are " used by such Advocates of a Faction, to overturn all the solid Maxims of Policy and Government, that have stood the Test for so many " Ages, and are confirmed by so long Experience *."

The chief Intention of all this Clamour is to spirit up a Faction, to favour the *French*, in reclaiming their Losses on the Continent of *North-America*. For, after so much Parade in mustering
Falsi-

* See Page 14, 15.

Falsities, and cloathing them with Invectives and groundless Aspersions, This Advocate for *Guadeloupe*, levels all his Strength against *Canada* and all *North-America*; as Conquests of no Value; as Acquisitions injurious to the Interest of *Britain*, and as Colonies dangerous and hurtful to their Mother Country.

“ *Canada*, says he, of itself is worth little or nothing; Can add nothing to *Great Britain* but a little Improvement of the *Furr Trade**.”
 “ Such an Acquisition, continues this Author, would be destructive; and a Peace, which should give us all *North America* might soon ruin *Britain*†;” “ thereby laying a Foundation of unpeopling *Britain* and strengthening *America* to revolt‡.” “ For, if we were to acquire all *Canada*, we should soon find *North America* itself too powerful, and too populous to be govern’d long by us at this Distance||; our Possessions in *North America*, such as we have an undoubted Title to, when they are properly secured to us by Treaty, and a well-established Barrier, being rather greater than we are able to manage to any good Purpose, and having already more Produce than they can dispose of§.”

Again he says, “ That *Britain* cannot acquire more Property upon the Continent of *America* without more Danger both to our Trade and
 “ Liber-

* See Page 5. Line 9. and Line 19. Page 7. Line 25.

† Page 6. Line 27, &c. Page 55. Line 4. Page 59. Line 6. Page 6. Line 12. Page 73, at the Bottom.

‡ Page 7. Line 11. Page 20. Line 17, &c. Page 30. Page 38. Line 33. Page 53. Line 9. Page 73. Line 34. Page 75, 76, 77.

|| Page 8. Line 33.

§ Page 29. Line 7, &c. Page 32, Line 19.

“ Liberty, than upon the Continent of *Europe* *.
 “ Because they will rival their Mother Country
 “ in her Trade and Manufactures †. And *Ca-*
 “ *nada* in the Possession of the *British* Nation,
 “ will become more instrumental and productive
 “ of the Grandeur, Shipping, and Wealth of
 “ *France* than it could possible have been, while
 “ in the Possession of the *French* themselves;
 “ for her Wealth and Naval Strength must be
 “ doubled in place of being weakned by this
 “ War; unless we acquire the Sugar-Islands at
 “ the same Time ‡.”

Thus I have collected the several Positions dispersed and enforced by the Letter-Writer throughout his several Letters, by which he attempts to support a *French* Interest, and to mislead the ignorant and credulous into a bad Opinion of our *North American* Colonies. Wherein at once he modestly condemns the Measures taken by the Wisdom of the Nation for the Support of those Plantations; alledges that all our Blood and Treasure expended in their Cause, is impolitic, raising up a People to ruin their Mother Country; and openly pleads for the re-establishment of the *French* in *Canada*, as a necessary Condition to prevent future Discords, War and Rebellion upon that Continent.

His Method to prove this Paradox is, in the first Place, to perswade us that *Canada* is not worth keeping. Secondly, That our own Colonies are growing ripe for a Revolt.

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* See Page 32. Line 10, &c. compared with Page 73. Line 33.

† Page 52. Line 22.

‡ Page 59. Line 3, &c. See also Page 77. Line 11, &c.

The first Part he attempts to prove from the Insignificancy of its Trade to *Great Britain*, compared with the advantages arising from the Produce of *Guadaloupe*.

The *Sugar Trade*, says he, is far preferable to the *Fur Trade*. What does a few *Hats* signify, compar'd with serving ourselves and other Countries with that Article of Luxury, *Sugar* : But *Canada* can afford no more than a little Extension of the *Fur Trade* *.

This is just the *Frenchman*: The Language of *Mirepoix*, who endeavour'd to divert the Blow, the *English* have given his Country, in *America*, by treating the Subject of the Dispute between *Great Britain* and *France*, about their Claims in *North America*, in a ludicrous Manner; as a Matter not worth their Attention: "What, says " *Mirepoix*, must we go to War and lose so many " *Heads* for a few *Hats*?" No, Sir! It was not then, nor is it now, considered in so narrow and despicable a Light. The War was begun to save our Property and our Trade in *North America* from utter Ruin, contrived and in part carried into Execution by the *French*.

This Property is that Extent of Dominion claimed by the Kings of *England*, by right of Discovery, and by the Law of Nations, from the Sea Coast, as far back as the Land extends, and not pre-occupied by any other *Christian* Power. The Advantages, which might be expected from such a vast extent of Territory, if it be judged of from the great Access of Power, Trade, and Riches gradually received by *England* from that Continent, in Proportion to the Extension of its Cultivation, are beyond all Conception.

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* See Page 5, and 7.

The Trade is not confin'd to a few *Hats*, nor to the Materials of which they are made. Consult the *Custom-House* Accounts of the *Exports* from the several Ports on that Coast, and it must be confessed, That the Revenue is much improved by the Trade of *North America*, and that the *Furs*, imported from thence, make the most immaterial Article. And whoever has a Capacity to peruse the Natural History of those distant Climates and Variety of Soils, will be informed that, Nature has reserved immense Treasures upon that Continent, and the adjacent Islands, and Seas, to reward the utmost of our Endeavours for their Preservation.

Besides, the Increase of *Indian* Friends is another Advantage. It delivers our Settlers from those Fears of being cut off by the *Savages* in their new Settlements; which always discourage the Progress of Cultivation and Industry in desert Countries; it opens a Way to new Discoveries in Trade and Commerce: and it improves the Consumption of the Manufactures of the Mother Country. Nobody can tell what the Back *Indians* can do, in regard to Trade: But every *Indian*, reduced to the *British* Yoke, will be cloathed with the Woolen Manufacture of *Great Britain*.

Therefore how preferable soever the *Sugar Trade* may be to the *Fur Trade*, that is not the Question: which according to this Author's Way of Reasoning, seems to be whether the War in *America* was begun for the sake of a few *Hats*, or the *Fur Trade*? and whether the *Fur Trade*, which that War has taken from the *French*, and given to the *English*, is worth keeping?

It is granted that *Sugar* is become a greater Necessary of Life than *Fur*. But it does not necessarily

necessarily follow that the Territory, where Sugar grows, is, for that Reason only, preferable to the Territory, where the Fur grows. The former may be superfluous, and interfere with the real Interest of the Sugar Trade, so far as to prevent its Cultivation. The latter may be improveable to a Variety of Uses, and produce many Things, which in course of Time, shall be found necessary to Mankind, and serve many other Purposes of Profit and Security; unto which a Sugar-Island, by its Situation, cannot pretend. As in the Case of *Guadaloupe*; that Island may produce a large Quantity of Sugar, but where can be the Advantage of its Produce to *Britain*; till it can be proved, that the *British* Sugar-Islands are not capable of producing a *sufficient* Quantity for the *European* Markets? what is *not wanted* is *not necessary*. But the Case of *Canada* is quite otherwise: Consider “that Country only, as productive of *Furs*: “that *Hats* are become a *necessary* Part of our Cloathing: “that *Britain* does not import from her own Settlements, nor has any Territory capable of supplying the *British* Dominions with *Furs*, necessary for home Consumption: “that the Addition of *Canada*, and its Dependencies, will not only deprive *France* of that lucrative Trade, but enable *Britain* to supply all *Europe* with *Hats* and *Furs*; and then judge, whether an Increase of *Sugar* or of *Furs* shall be most eligible, by a Nation in our present Circumstances. We are able to supply every Demand of Sugar without *Guadaloupe*: we are not able to carry on the *Fur Trade* with Advantage, except we can keep *Canada*: therefore *Canada* is preferable to *Guadaloupe*, should one of those Territories be yielded up to the Enemy; especially, if we

take into our Argument the *local Security*, which our Plantations shall enjoy from that Acquisition, and the Deliverance of *Britain*, the Mother Country, from continual War and endless Expences, to counteract the Schemes of *France*, for wresting the whole Territory of *North America* from the Sovereignty of the *British* Crown. Besides, the internal Advantages, which are not yet discovered by the Conquerors, and have been disputed at such a vast Expence by *France*, enhance the Value of *Canada* to *Great Britain*.

To evade the Conclusiveness of these Arguments, the Letter-Writer replies.

First, " That the *French* Trade and Naval Strength can never be humbled, but by taking their *Sugar-Islands* from them; and " that, if they be left in Possession of all the Islands, they now have in the *West Indies*, the *French* must still remain too strong for us, and raise their Naval Strength with more Rapidity from that Quarter, after the Peace*.

Here I declare my Opinion, That no Peace should be given, without *Britain's* receiving a suitable Indemnification for the Blood and Treasure we have spent in doing ourselves Justice: And further, that the Conquests, which shall appear, in a political View, the least advantageous, should not be restored to the Enemy, when a Peace can be settled upon any other Terms. — But, I can't grant that *France* has acquir'd, or can derive all her Naval Strength from the *West Indies*. For, it is beyond Controversy, That the greatest Increase of the *French* Naval Power was from the Navigation of the *North American Fishery*: In which

* See Page 75.

which Nursery their best and most numerous Seamen were brought up ; and whose Ruin has effectually deprived the *French* of the Means to recruit their Navy.—If my Information does not err, which I have no Reason to suspect, the *French* Navigation in the *North American* Seas exceeded the Number of Ships employed to their *West India* Islands, almost two thirds, in the whole ; before they were driven out of that Station and destroy'd by our Fleets.

It is also a Truth, that can't be contradicted, That whoever is in Possession of all *North America* will always be able to distress and to take the *West India Islands* : Therefore, should the Sovereigns, to whom they belong, make a bad Use of them, to the Prejudice of the *British* Empire upon that Continent, or in any other Part of the World, *Great Britain* would always have it in its Power to add them to the rest of her Conquests.

The Navigation to the *Sugar Islands* and the Traffic with their Produce must be allowed considerable. By the Shipping the *French* acquire many good Seamen. By their *Sugar, Indigo, &c.* their Nation is greatly enrich'd. But this does not prove, That the superior Strength of our Enemy lies in their Possession of the *Sugar Islands*, or that their Naval Strength shall rise with more Rapidity from that Quarter after a Peace. Because, if we look back into the State of the Naval Strength of France ; it will be found, That their Navy has never been so respectable, as about the Conclusion of the last Century ; when *France* bid Defiance to the combined Fleets of *England* and *Holland* ; which was before their Commerce with the *Sugar Islands* had arrived to any Degree of pub-

lie Utility to their Naval or Mercantile Interest. Therefore, their Strength by Sea has not increased with their Improvement of the Sugar Islands. Or, if the *French* have increased their Naval Force by those Possessions, it's present ruin'd State proves that *Great Britain*, which has destroy'd it, has increased much more by the Commerce and Navigation of their Possessions on the Continent of *North America*, within the same Epocha or Point of Time; and, consequently, That an Increase of Property, on that Continent, is of more real Value, than an Addition of Territory amongst the *West Indian* Islands; and that the *French* Trade and Naval Strength do not depend upon their *Sugar Islands*.

Secondly, he urges, " That *France* draws almost all her Wealth from the *West Indies*: " That the *French* are injur'd most by the Loss of their *Sugar Islands*: " That any Conquest made of those Islands by the *English*, will increase the Naval Strength and Trade of their Mother Country, and " That *Island Colonies* are preferable to those established on the *Continent*.

We will consider each of these Assertions. The Wealth drawn from the *West Indies* by the *French* may be allowed considerable: but, far from being *almost all*—Had they not more and greater Resources for Money, How could the *French* be able to carry on so long and expensive a War; since their *West India* Trade has been almost totally ruin'd? Did they receive no Profits from their *Beaver Trade* and *Fishery*? By which they beat the *English* out of all Markets for *Fish*, *Hats* and *Peltery*. By the *Gum-Trade* they maintain'd a *Monopoly* of a profitable Commodity, without which many of our *Silk* and *Linen Manufactures* could

could not be properly dressed for Sale. Their Progress in Opposition to our *Turkey Trade* was sensibly felt by our Merchants; and the Riches they drew out of the *East India Trade* is better understood by those, who know their Power beyond the Line, and the immense Sums paid to them by *English* Smugglers, for Teas and other Produce and Manufactures of *India* and *China*, than can be possibly decypher'd by a Pen, confin'd to Brevity. The only use I propose to make of this Deduction of Facts, relating to the Trade of *France*, is to expose the Disingenuity of a Man, who pretends to Knowledge in what he writes, and peremptorily asserts a Falshood, " That *France* draws almost all her Wealth from the *West Indies*; which, upon a moderate Computation, is not a fifth Part arising from her Commerce; exclusive of the extraordinary Balance, which, in peaceable Times, *France* receives from *England* and other Countries in *Europe*.

That the *French* are injured by the Loss of *Guadaloupe*, or any of their Sugar Islands, is not controverted: But that the Trade and Naval Strength of *France* are supported principally by those Islands, has no foundation in Truth. So far as the *Exports* and *Imports* of those Islands increased the Revenue of their Mother Country, employed the Manufacturers and Merchants; and so far as their Shipping supplied the Royal Navy with Sailors, those Islands contributed towards the Increase of Trade and Naval Strength; and in this Light it was a right Measure to take *Guadaloupe*, &c. But the Trade and Navigation of this Island never produced an hundredth Part Increase to the National Trade of *France*, nor yet a Number of Sailors, in one Year, sufficient to
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mann a King's Frigate of 34 Guns. How then can it be asserted with so much Confidence, That *France* is injured most by the Loss of her Sugar Islands? Had this Author pinn'd his Argument upon the *American Fishery*, instead of the *Sugar-trade of Guadaloupe*, he would have argued more consistently. For the *French* are supposed to have employed 16000 Seamen in their *Newfoundland-Fishery*, and to have received a Ballance from other Nations of 1,400,000 Pounds annually, by the Sale of their Fish: all which is now lost.

That the Conquests, made by the *English* over the *Sugar Islands*, will increase the Naval Strength and Trade of their Mother Country is also granted. But that an Increase of the Sugar Trade is more advantageous to *England*, than the several Trades, which are carried on, and may be improved and discovered in *North America*, for the Interest of the Mother Country, is very wide of the Truth, as I have already proved at large: and, as to the *Naval Strength of Britain*, all that the *Sugar Islands* could add might be a few Sailors, which are not wanted: For, it is certain, that those Islands produce no Naval Stores; which are, or might be found in Abundance, by proper Cultivation in *North America*. Therefore, if this Criterion is to decide the Merits of *Canada* and *Guadaloupe*; no Body would hesitate to give the Preference to *Canada*.

The Notion of *Island Colonies* being preferable to those establish'd on a Continent, comes next under Consideration. Should not this Reasoner have inform'd the Reader, whether he means a *Continent*, like that of *Europe*, which is occupied by civilized and powerful Nations; or a *Continent*, like that of *North America*, whose Lands
are,

are, by the Law of Nations, secured to the first Discoverer? If he would have the Reader understand him to refer to a *European*, or to any other civilized and powerful Continent, where no Colony can be sought, nor settled without invading the undoubted Right and Property of another Potentate, who, by the Law of Nations, has an exclusive Right; or even should a Colony be attempted by Right of Conquest on such a Continent, *Island Colonies* would be much preferable, in the Option of an Island Power; because the less Connection an Island State has with the Affairs of a Continent, divided into several powerful Nations, the better. Colonies on such a Continent would necessarily embroil that Island-State, its Mother Country, in an Interest foreign to her own, and require such a Defence, as would be inconsistent with the Mother's natural Strength: Therefore, *Island Colonies* are preferable to continental ones for an Island-State.

It is not so in Regard to Colonies settled on such a Continent as *North America*: where it was the Lot of *England* to make the first Discovery and Settlement. Her chief Care was to keep out all other *European* Nations; and now it is her Interest to drive them out, who, by any Means, have attempted to encroach upon our Discoveries, and to spirit up the *Indian* Natives to treat us as Enemies.

The State of the Case is widely different; where a Colony is to be maintained amidst Enemies, as powerful as ourselves; and where the whole Continent is in our own Power. Which must be the Fact, should *England* keep Possession of her Conquests in *Canada*, &c. for then she would have no *European* Power to contend with in *North America*;

America ; the Natives would peaceably enjoy the Advantages of a *British* Government ; and we receive the Profits of an *exclusive* Trade, which has already been found more desirable than the Mines of *Peru* and *Mexico*.

As to that Part of the Argument, which urges, " That an Increase of Sugar Islands, or " the acquiring more Territory in the *West Indies*, will not only increase the Consumption of " the *British* Produce, with the Trade and Shipping from thence, but also the Consumption " of the *American* Produce, with the Trade and " Shipping from the *West Indies* to *America*, and " from *America* to *England*."—All this shall be granted.—But this does not prove, That *Guadaloupe*, or any other Acquisition of Property amongst the *Sugar Islands*, ought to be kept in Preference to an UNIVERSAL EMPIRE on the Continent of NORTH AMERICA. On the Contrary, it shews the Necessity of totally extirpating the *French* from that Continent. Because, what Nation soever shall have the SOLE Possession of *North America*, that Nation will always have it in its Power to distress and to take the *Sugar Islands* : But, the greatest Efforts, that could be made from the *West Indies* could never reduce the vast Continent of *North America*. So that the Argument of mutual Advantage between the *West India* Islands and the *North American* Continent, cannot prove the Necessity of keeping *Guadaloupe*, in Preference to *Canada* ; but, on the Contrary, it calls upon us to maintain and pursue our Conquests on the Continent, till our Strength in *North America* shall be able to make the *Sugar Islands* entirely dependant upon the Measures, which
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Great Britain shall take, in Regard to their Trade.

In Order to evade these Reasons, the Letter-Writer advanceth two Paradoxes. "One asserts "that our Colonies in *North America* are able "to support themselves *, against the Power of "the *French*." The other declares it hurtful and dangerous to her Trade and Policy for *Great Britain* to drive the *French* out of *Canada*, and to encourage the Increase of Territory, or to extend her Colonies on the Continent of *North America*.

To countenance these Inconsistencies, he computes the Number of *English* Subjects in *North America* to be ten Times more than the *French* have on that Continent; and then, with an Air of Triumph, asks †, "In what a dastardly Shape "do they represent their Country, when they "tell us, that 1000 *French* will drive 10000 "*British* out of *America*?"—This Asperſion was never deserved by the Behaviour of our Countrymen: I dare say, none but a Friend to a *French* Faction would have insinuated such a shameful Assertion. — But, who can recollect the Impunity, with which the *French* openly acted in the Prosecution of their favourite Scheme to drive the *English* out of *North America*, by their Encroachments and Fortifications erected upon our back Settlements; and the Enmity they indefatigably propagated against the *English*, not only amongst the Independent, but amongst those *Indians*, who were under the Ties of the most sacred Covenants of Peace and Commerce with *Great Britain*? Or, who remembers the Conſter-

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* See Page 19.

† Page 19.

nation of this Nation, at the Defeat of the *British* Forces under *Braddock*, by the *French* and their *Indian* Friends, and think slightly of the Power and ruinous Projects of *France* in *North America*? And, though the *French* have been at last driven out of their Encroachments, and out of *Cape Breton* and *Canada*, with their Dependencies, by the *British* Fleets and Armies; those Atchievements were not effected without great Risk, and vast Expence both of Money and Lives, from *Britain*. The national Account for Supplies, during this War, amounts to many Millions Sterling, for the *North American* Service. The Defeat of the *British* Forces at *Fort Du Quesne* and *Ticondarago*, and the Check received under General *Murray* at *Sillery*, are Facts, which prove the Difficulty to curb their Insolence and Ambition, and to chastise them for their Perfidy and Encroachments; and may give us an Idea of their comparative Strength, on that Continent, much better than all Calculations and Computations, made on Paper, of the Number of Men under the *French* Yoke in *North America*.

It is true the *French* are conquered, but it was such a Conquest, as cover'd *Britain* with Mourning. The Tears of the Fatherless and of the Widow, and the bleeding Hearts of Parents for the Loss of their Sons, such as a *Howe* and a *Wolfe*, have confirmed, beyond Contradiction, That *North America* was not able to defend itself against the *French* in Possession of *Canada*; and that it was with the utmost Difficulty and Hazard the whole Force by Sea and Land, which *Great Britain* was able to spare for that Service, has, at last,

last, disarm'd and reduced them to the *British* Government.

A little Speculation might also discover, from whence the Strength of the *French* arose to such a Height in *Canada*.—This is ascribed to two principal Causes.—The continual Attention, which, from the first Establishment of their Settlements in *North America*, the *French* have given towards their Prosperity; and their Diligence to supplant the *English* in the good Opinion of the *Natives*.

That Attention erected the Fortifications of *Louisbourg* and *Quebec*, in the Infant State of those Colonies; laid a Plan to cut off all Communication between the *British* Plantations and the *Indian* Traders; enforced that Project by a Chain of Forts from the Mouth of the *Mississippi*, in the Bay of *Mexico*, almost as far Northward as *Hudson's Bay*; and put them upon Measures to worm the *English* out of the immense Profits of the *Newfoundland* Fishery; and procured the Settlers, on the North of the Bay and River of *St. Laurence*, any Privileges and Encouragements they required from *Old France*.

By this Means the *Canadians* and *Acadians* were always prepared not only for Defence, but to seize upon all Advantages, which might offer, to increase their Territory, to enlarge their Power and to improve their Trade. They watched every Opportunity to lessen the Interest and to abridge the Dominion of the *British* Crown amongst the *Americans*, and to sow Jealousies, Discontent and Disloyalty amongst the *British* Subjects; employing every Engine to improve their Possessions, at the Expence of their peaceable Neighbours.

Their Diligence to drive the *English* out of their Property in *North America* is discoverable in many Particulars.—Their Policy encouraged, and, in some Measure, obliged the Soldiers and Labourers of all the inferior Class of *Europeans* settled in *Canada* and *Acadia* and their Dependencies, to intermarry with the *Native Indians*: By which Art of Government the *Population* was forwarded in a quick Increase, without drawing too great a Number from their Native Country; and a Way was open'd effectually to gain the Affections of the Natives. A Method dictated by the Practice of the wisest Nation; but not yet adopted by *British* Colonists; tho' nothing scarce could contribute so much to secure their Settlements from the Incursions, Depredations and frequent Barbarities of the Savages; and to gain their Love and Affections, as to incorporate with them by Marriage.

Their Missionaries, who travel by Sea and Land to make Converts to the *Church of Rome*, spared no Pains to instruct those Heathens in such Doctrines as, at once, made them Profelytes to their own Superstition, and Enemies to the very Name of an *Englishman*. These Priests were not only to be found in religious Houses, founded in the principal Towns, and in Parochial Churches; but dispersed amongst those, who were scattered in the Wilds of that vast Continent, without a Place of fixt abode; always endeavouring by their small Presents, and, by *becoming all Things to all Men*, to gain their Esteem and Affection for the King of *France*; when it was not in their Power to bring about an Alteration in their religious Principles. By this Means the Interest and Strength of *France* have increased on that Continent, beyond

yond Imagination; and the Interest and Power of the *English* have been greatly diminished. Yet, neither the Love of their Country, nor a Desire to convert many to the Purity of the Gospel, has hitherto influenced either our Ministry to forward *the Propagation of the Gospel* and the national Interest, by encouraging a numerous and pious Mission; or excited such Missionaries, as have been maintained, at particular Settlements, to pursue a laudable Imitation of those in the *Romish* Mission, and in the Interest of the *French* Nation.

By thus incorporating with the Natives, and by instilling their religious and political Principles into those of distant Provinces, it is easy to collect the Reason why the *French* Force in *North America* was found to be so much upon an Equality with the *English*, even when the Colonies were powerfully supported by the Arms of their Mother Country, and far superior, compared with the whole Strength of the Provincials; notwithstanding the vast Disproportion between the Number of the People, subject to the two Crowns on that Continent, which the Letter-Writer makes *ten to one*: a Computation, though allowed in a comparative Account of the *Europeans* and their particular Issue settled on that Continent, far from the Truth; when we include the Alliances, or those Numbers of the *Native Indians* gained over by their Priests and Marriages to the *French* Interest, which enabled them to contend so long in a doubtful War, for the sole Dominion in *North America*; which they would have carried, with much Ease, had they been permitted to measure the Length of their Swords with the *British Provincials* only.

However, continues this Writer, it is *hurtful* and *dangerous* to the *Trade* and *Policy* of *Great Britain*, to drive the *French* out of *Canada*; and to encourage either the Increase of Trade, on the Extent of Territory in our *North American* Colonies.

The Acquisition of *Canada*, says he*, would be destructive to *Britain*: “ Because such a Country as *North America*, ten Times larger in Extent than *Britain*, richer in Soil, in most Places; all the different Climates you can fancy; all the Lakes and Rivers for Navigation one could wish; Plenty of Wood for Shipping; and as much Iron, Hemp, and Naval Stores, as any Part of the World; such a Country at such a Distance could never remain long subject to *Britain*. You have taught them the Art of War, and put Arms in their Hands†, and they can furnish themselves with every Thing in a few Years, without the Assistance of *Britain*. They are always grumbling and complaining against *Britain*, even while they have the *French* to dread: What may they not be supposed to do, if the *French* be no longer a Check upon ’em? you must keep a numerous standing Army to overawe them: These Troops will soon get Wives and Possessions, and become *Americans*.—Thus, from these Measures, you lay the surest Foundation of unpeopling § *Britain*, and of strengthening *America* to revolt.”

“ As *America*, continues this Author||, increases

* See Page 6 and 7, compared with Page 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 52, 53. † Page 57.

§ Page 31 about colonizing, and Page 12, 48 and 49.

|| Page 20.

“ in People, so she must increase in Arts and
 “ Sciences, in Manufactures and Trade *, while
 “ she has the same Laws, Liberties and Genius,
 “ we have at Home: The more she increases in
 “ these, the less she must want from *Britain*:
 “ The more she rises above a certain Pitch, her
 “ Utility and Advantage to *Britain* must propor-
 “ tionably decrease.”——And † she will rival
 “ you in the *West Indies*. *America* will furnish
 “ those Islands with every Thing that now comes
 “ from *England*, and can do it cheaper: So that
 “ the Trade and Grandeur of *Great Britain* soon
 “ comes to an End ‡, when *America* and the
 “ *West Indies* are no longer of any use to her.”

“ Is it possible to imagine that so extensive
 “ and so fertile a Country as *North America*,
 “ which we now would grasp at, can long re-
 “ main dependant upon, and subject to *Great*
 “ *Britain* §? If it does not become our Master,
 “ it must soon, very soon, stand our powerful
 “ Rival in all the Branches of our Trade ||. The
 “ dangerous Practices of the *North Americans* a-
 “ gainst *Great Britain* are too well known al-
 “ ready ¶. And *Canada*, join'd to what we
 “ have in *America*, will prove our Destruction **.
 “ Therefore, nothing can secure *Great Britain* so
 “ much against the Revolting of *North America*,
 “ as the *French* keeping some Footing there, to
 “ be a Check upon them. And, if we acquire
 “ all *Canada*, we should soon find *North America*
 “ itself

* See Page 29.

† Page 29 and 30.

‡ *America*, as she rises to Maturity, may endanger our Trade and Liberty both, Page 75.

§ Page 30, 57, 58.

|| Page 32.

¶ Page 53.

** Page 60.

“ itself too powerful, and too populous to
 “ be long govern’d at such Distance *; and
 “ the Wealth and Naval Strength of *France*
 “ doubled, should *Canada* remain in the Posses-
 “ sion of *Great Britain*; for, then it would be-
 “ come more instrumental and productive of
 “ the Grandeur, Shipping and Wealth of *France*,
 “ than it could possibly have been, while in the
 “ Possession of the *French* themselves †.

Let us examine these peremptory Assertions with Candour, and with due Attention to the real Interest of our Country. He threatens our Island with *Depopulation*, *Loss of Trade*, and with *Rebellion* and *Loss of our Liberty*, from the Increase of Territory in *North America*.

To rivet the Fears of *Depopulation*, he exhausts his small Fund of *History*, which only serves to expose his Ignorance, and to convince us, that he is ready to advance any Thing in Favour of his factious Arguments.—He calls in *Greece*, *Rome*, and *Spain*, by Way of Proof, That *Colonizing* is no desirable Scheme. He pretends that there are but few Precedents to be found of *Colonizing* amongst the *Grecians* and *Romans*, and that those were *small* on the Coast of *Asia*, and left by them a shameful Prey to the *Persians*; and that *Spain*, in modern Times, grasped at Conquests in a foreign Country in the New World, so far above the Extent and Ability of the Mother Country, that she *dispeopled* herself, and gradually declined from being the Dread of *Europe*, and the first Naval Power, to the State she is now in §.

The Colonies of *Greece* were many, extensive and

* See Page 8.

† Page 59.

§ Page 31.

and powerful, and many of them far distant from their Mother Country. What was *Gallo-Grecia*, the *Grecian Colonies in Italy, Sicily and Africa*? what were the *Athenian Colonies*, which *Demosthenes*, with all his Eloquence and Interest represented in the most advantageous Lights, and recommended to the Protection of their Mother Country against the Arms of *Philip the Macedonian*: who made sure of the Conquest of *Athens* and all *Greece*, could he deprive them of the Succours and Assistance of their Colonies. What raised the Power of *Carthage* so high as to contend with *Rome* for universal Empire; but the Supplies she received from her large and powerful Colonies in *Spain*, and on the Coasts of *Africa* and *Italy*; and when this Petty Republic lost her Colonies, she lost her Power also.

The many, distant and expensive Colonies under the Dominion of the *Roman Republic and Empire*, are so well known to every School-Boy, that reads *Livy, Cesar's Commentaries*, and *Tacitus*, that I can't believe the Advocate for *Guadaloupe* to be serious in his Declaration, that they were *few and small*. The *Romans* extended their Power over all the known World: and so long as the governing Party of that vast Empire remain'd honest to their Country, their Colonies never thought of *revolting*.

His Misrepresentation of *Spain* is no less notorious, hearken to *Don Geronymo de Uztaris**,
 " On this Occasion I have thought proper to shew,
 " that poor and depopulate, as some Provinces
 G " of

* Knight of St. *Jago*, Member of the King of *Spain's* Privy Council and Chambers of the *Indies*, Vol. I. p. 44, &c. of his *Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs*,

“ of *Spain* are found to be, *the Thing is not*
 “ *owing so much to those, that have gone over*
 “ *to the Indies, as to other Causes. Cantabria,*
 “ *Navarra, Asturia, the Mountains of Burgos*
 “ *and Galicia, are the Provinces from whence most*
 “ *Spaniards pass to those Parts.—And yet these*
 “ *Provinces continue to be the best peopled in*
 “ *Spain.*

“ From the Province of *Toledo, la Mancha,*
Guadalaxara, Cuenca, Loria, Segovia, Valladolid,
 “ *Salamanca, and others of Castile, few go to the*
 “ *Indies; yet these are the least populous Parts of*
 “ *Spain. So that we must look out for some*
 “ *other Cause; and I discover none but the Po-*
 “ *verty, that proceeds from the Ruin of Trade*
 “ *and Manufactures; and heavy Taxes collected*
 “ *with Extortion and Abuse *. From these en-*
 “ *sue the Destruction of some, and the extreme*
 “ *Poverty of others; which, as it takes away*
 “ *all Disposition for a married State, dispirits the*
 “ *Industrious, and disables many from bringing*
 “ *up their Children, and many married that are*
 “ *grown up from maintaining themselves by their*
 “ *Labour, and hastens the Death of many in the*
 “ *Prime of Life, by an Excess of Fatigue and*
 “ *a Want of the Recruits of Life, prevents a*
 “ *Kingdom from being populous.”*

Another Argument that the Depopulation of
Spain

* The Poverty of *Spain* is also greatly increased by the Encroachments of the *Clergy and Religious*, who under various Pretences of promoting the Happiness of a rich Penitent, frequently lop off Part of an Inheritance, and have thereby reduced many Families to Beggary. An Observation of which this learned *Spaniard* was not ignorant; but could not be exemplified under the Circumstances, to which every Author is obliged to submit, where the *Inquisition* is established,

Spain is not owing to the Discovery or Possession of the *Indies*, as some believe; is, that *France*, "*England* and *Holland* have several Provinces and "*Colonies* in the *East* and *West Indies*, without "*reducing* the Number of their People in *Europe*. From these Considerations it is inferred, "*that the Indies* are not the Thing that enervates "*and dispeoples Spain*; but the Commodities, "*by which Foreigners* have drain'd us of Money, and destroyed our Manufactures, at the "*same time that our heavy Taxes continue.*"

And this may serve for a full Answer to the Letter-Writer's historical Account of *Depopulation* by the Settlement of Colonies. Tho' there is another obvious Reason for the *Depopulation* or, at least, for the small Increase of Men and of the Fruits of Industry in *Spain*: which is the Impolitic Doctrine of Celibacy, and the Multitude of Holidays, in which their Church enjoins them to rest from Labour. This Discouragement of Matrimony and National Industry, multiplies lazy Priests and Religious of both Sexes, and covers the Country with Poverty and Beggary.

Natural History furnishes another Argument against this Author's Reasoning. They who have studied Nature, have always determin'd by their Observations, That all Southern Colonies weaken and depopulate their Mother Country. *Aristotle* and *Hippocrates* affirm, that *Moist and Heat* are the Causes of Putrefaction: and consequently, those Climates, where *Moist and Heat* prevail, as in the *Sugar-Islands* and *Louissiana*, may destroy a great many Settlers. But our *Northern Colonies* are healthful, and the Settlers therein increase: of which we need look no farther for a Proof, than the Accounts transmitted to the Board of

Trade and Plantations concerning the Cause of the Weakness of the Sugar Colonies, and of the great Disproportion the Inhabitants of *South Carolina* bears to the rest of the *North American* Colonies. The same is confirm'd by the Weakness of the *French Sugar-Islands*; the most considerable of which, in this Author's Opinion, was not able to resist two Regiments of *British Forces*.

From hence it is a fair Conclusion, that however ruinous it is to establish Colonies in the *Southern* Climates; it is no ways depopulating the Mother Country to establish Colonies in the *North*: and that *Canada* is a cold and wholesome Country, but the *Sugar-Islands* and *Louissiana* being hot and moist, are Colonies that can't be maintain'd without diminishing the Numbers of People in their Mother Country.

His *commercial* Genius is equally defective. If his Reasoning on this Subject be just, it proves too much. It holds good, not only against an Increase of Territory; but against all Colonies upon the Continent of *North America*. For, he does not allow, that there can be any Acquisition of Trade, except in *Furs* and *Naval Stores*, by the taking of *Canada*; and yet insists upon the Ruin of the Staple Trades in *Britain*, by the Improvements, likely to be made, in all Sorts of Manufactures, Arts and Sciences in our *North American* Colonies; which amounts to an entire Proscription of that Country, in whose Defence *Great Britain* commenced and carries on the present War.

Yes, he allows that the *American* Colonies may carry their Trade to a certain Pitch, and be of Use and Benefit to their Mother Country. Should not this presumptive Writer give us a Gauge, where-

whereby to ascertain that *Pitch*, or *Height*, above which it would be dangerous for the Mother Country to permit her Colonies to become her Rivals in Trade? Will he pretend, that they have already attained *that Pitch*? Will he deny their *present Utility* and *Advantage* to *Great Britain*? If neither of these are attainable, there can be no Fear that this numerous People can become less useful and beneficial to their Mother Country; or can be raised to such a *Pitch* of Trade, by the Addition of Territory in proportion to their Increase in Number of Souls, as to rival, or in anywise to injure the Trade of *Great Britain*.—It is not the Increase of the People; where there is a proportionable Increase of Territory: but the Increase, of Mouths, where they have not Land to employ them in the Cultivation of the Necessaries of Life, which puts them upon Invention, and obliges them to turn their Thoughts and their Hands to Manufactures. Therefore it is self-evident, that an Increase of Territory in *North America* is the best Means to keep our Colonies in a State of *Utility* and *Advantage* to *Great Britain*. For, if their Lands be immense; there can be no Danger of the People's ever becoming so numerous, as to want Employment in that advantageous and useful Way, in which they *now* flourish, to the Honour and Interest of their Mother Country.

As to the Trade carried on between the *North American* Plantations and our *Island Colonies*; it is of that Nature, as, in no wise to effect the Commerce of *Great Britain*. The Lumber exported from *North America* to the Islands are such Things, without which the *Islanders* can't carry on their Manufactures, and can't be supply'd with them from

from their Mother Country. In return the Importers are paid in Money, or in the Manufactures and Produce of the Islands, which has not been known to enhance the Price of *Rum, Sugar, Coffee, Piemento*, or any other Commodity brought from the Islands to *Britain*; or in anywise to effect her Trade.

The particular Instances of *Wood for Shipping*, of *Iron*, of *Hemp*, and of *Naval Stores*; the more *North America*, under the *British* Government, shall improve these valuable Branches, the greater will be the Blessing to its Mother Country. The Decay of *Oak* in *Old England*, which is but too visible in the total Extirpation of her largest Plantations of that Naval Timber: The Impossibility of procuring *Masts* fit for our Ships of War without the Assistance of the Wood in *North America*: The Hazard and Distress to which *Britain* might be reduced for *Iron, Hemp, Pitch and Tar* by an Embargo upon those Commodities in *Sweden, Russia, &c.* without which the Naval Power of *Great Britain* could not put to Sea; I say, all these Interesting Considerations ought to prevail, as they do, with this Nation, not to be jealous of the *American Trade*; but to encourage the Growth of *Wood for Shipping*, and the Produce and Manufacture of all Sorts of *Naval Stores*, as the most certain Way to have a constant Supply for our Navy, and as the greatest Benefit to the Nation in general; because it would make those immense Sums of Ready Money, paid by our Merchants to the *Swedes, Russians, &c.* to circulate in our own Colonies, and to become the Purchase of our *Woollen, Silk and Linen Manufactures*.

There is one Thing more I shall just mention, before we pass from this Article of Trade. It is

con-

concerning the *Price of Labour*; where this is high, there can be no Expectation of establishing Manufactures, to vie with the Staple Commerce of *Great Britain*. But, such is the want of Hands in *North America*, that a white Man won't work under Two and Six-pence to Four Shillings a Day Wages, in the most ordinary Business, and in Proportion for better Work, which will never be able to send Goods to Market at a cheaper Rate, than they are supplied with from *Great Britain* and *Ireland*.

But the greatest Bug-bear still remains behind. "Canada, says he, join'd to the *British* Empire, "in *North America*, will prove our Destruction: "the *French*, by keeping some Footing there, "can be the only Check against our Colonies "casting off the Yoke of their Mother Country: "and should *Britain* drive the *French* off that "Continent, the Wealth and Naval Strength "of *France* would be doubled, and the Liberty "of *Great Britain* would be endanger'd and "lost."

With what View can such Paradoxes be openly and with Assurance publish'd? The original Dispute between *Britain* and *France* was about *Protection* and *Commerce*: that our *North American* Colonies might extend their Plantations, without Molestation or Obstruction from the Encroachments of the *French*, and enjoy the Trade and Navigation, agreeable to Treaties subsisting between *Great Britain* and all Nations. But neither of these Points were attainable without driving the *French* out of *Canada*.

By the Way and Aid of *Canada*, the *French* had schemed the Ruin of the *British* Trade and Power on that Continent; built those Forts, which
were

were destin'd to complete that ruinous Scheme, and were defended so long and doubtfully against the Arms of *Great Britain*: And had found Means to gain over to their Interest the most Part of the Native *Indians*, to join with them in the total Extirpation of the *English* from *North America*.

Thus we discover, That, so long as *Canada* should continue in the Possession of the *French*, there could be no Security to our Colonies: their Back Settlements would have been ever exposed to all those Encroachments, Ravages, Barbarities and Ruin, which they heretofore experienced under the Faith of Treaties from the perfidious *French*. Their Security consists only in our Possession and keeping of *Canada*: No Barrier can possibly be equivalent to this Security. To place it in Forts, to be erected and garrison'd 400 Miles and upwards from the cultivated Lands already settled, is a very precarious, and at best a most expensive Barrier. *France*, by her Motions and Preparations, might keep us always under a Necessity to lie upon our Arms, in a perpetual State of Jealousy and Expence, at those Forts; or they from *Canada* might soon make themselves Masters of such a Barrier, if neglected. It is an easy Matter for any Power or State to find an Opportunity to countenance Hostilities, when War becomes their Interest, or Ambition stirs them up to Arms. And there can be very little Hopes that *France* remaining in Possession of *Canada*, and risking the Event of the present War, rather than amicably to settle the Boundaries on the *Ohio*, according to the Covenant of the Treaty at *Aix la Chapelle*, would sit down contented with any Boundary, that should deprive

her

her of those fruitful Plains, and other Advantages proposed from that Scheme.

Therefore, if our Plantations and Right to the Sovereignty of *North America* be worth Protection: if their Trade be of any Utility and Advantage to *Britain*; there can be no Way to protect them, nor to secure our Commerce with that vast Continent, but by keeping Possession of *Canada*, which Providence has put into our Hands.

How badly then does it suit a *British* Pen to seek for Safety to the Power, Dominion, and Commerce of *Great Britain*, in the Arms of her natural Enemy? How scandalous and unjust to stigmatize our Brethren in *North America* with Discontent, Disloyalty, and Rebellion, who have never given the least Reason for such Imputations? Is it not seen, that wherever the *French* get footing, they encroach upon their Neighbours? They intermeddle with their Laws, Religion and Government. They stir up unheard of Claims, and unnatural Practices against their Governors. Their frequent Attempts upon *Savoy* and *Piedmont*; upon *Geneva*, and the Canton of *Berne*, oblige those States to be continually arm'd in their own Defence against a Nation, who pretends to be at Peace with them. *Spain* and *Germany* have often suffered Loss by placing too much Security in *French* Faith. The Invasion of *Holland* should deter any of her Neighbours, in all Parts of the World, from placing too much Confidence in Barriers, only created by Treaties: And the several causeless Invasions and Rebellions made and fomented in these Kingdoms by the *French*, should convince us, that no Faith of Treaties, nor any Security, that does not de-

prive them of Power to renew Hostilities, can deliver us from her Encroachments and ruinous Practices upon the Continent of *North America*. It never can be the Interest of *France* to keep the Subjects of the *British* Empire in *America* in their Allegiance. It is a wonderful Act of Providence, that they had hitherto not attempted to stir them up to Rebellion, and endeavour'd by transporting the Pretender to that Continent, to surprise the Colonists into a Humour to follow his Pretensions.

What may be in the Womb of Providence, it is not in the Power of Man to discover. The rise of great Empires from very insignificant Beginnings, and their Growth by very trifling and unforeseen Circumstances; and also the Decay and Ruin not only of their Government, Power and Constitution; but of their Trade, Manufactures, and of their very Cities, are Facts, which serve to convince us, That there is no Stability upon the Earth: That no People can arrive at so high a Pitch of Riches and Power, as to be above the Reach of Providence, and not subject to Decay: nor any Nation so despicable, as not to profit and increase in Strength and Wealth by their Trade and good Laws.—That Corruption, Luxury and a general Decay of Religion, Piety, Industry, and Love for our Country may in Time, weaken the Strength, and reduce *Great Britain* to a State of Slavery; and that there may hereafter rise up a vast Empire of our Brethren in *North America*, with Power to give Laws to all the World, are Events that I won't pretend to affirm or deny. But, because this is possible, therefore it must come to pass, is a bad Argument. On the contrary we have all the Reason in the World

to

to believe, That our Brethren in *North America* will *never revolt* from their Mother Country, and that their Increase of Power and Strength is likely to turn out the best Aid to *Britain* against both her foreign and domestic Foes.

View those Colonies in every Shape; and nothing will be found to lead us to such an injurious Reflexion upon their Gratitude and Loyalty. No People ever attempted an Independency without some apparent Complaint of their Governors; or to better their Condition.—Liberty, Religion, Commerce and Protection, if they thrive and are ascertained; there can be no Fear of Revolt.

North America, under the *British* Dominion, enjoys every Blessing of a free People. Here our "Letter-Writer confesses, " That Liberty blossoms and flourishes with more natural and brilliant Lustre, than ever it did in any new-establiſh'd Colonies, that we read of since the "Creation of the World*." Under whose Favour and Protection? not of *France*, situate on their Backs, and watching an Opportunity to extirpate the Name of *Britain* from that Continent; but of *Great Britain* governing them by wholesome and equitable Laws, protecting them from all Invaders of their Liberty and Property, and admitting them to the Enjoyment of the Rights and Privileges of their Mother Country.

Can it be possible to form the least Idea of a Revolt amongst a People in these happy Circumstances, and where a Revolt would precipitate them into such a Situation, as would deprive them not only of the Advantages reaped in their Civil

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* See Page 76. Line 21. &c.

Capacity, from the *British* Constitution; but of Protection and Commerce with foreign Nations: without which, tho' they might exist by their own Labour and Produce, their Increase in Numbers would only serve to increase their Poverty?

Should *Britain* withdraw her Protection, her Coasts of 500 Leagues extent, would become an easy Prey to her Enemies. Should they rebel, to what Market could the Colonists carry their Produce and Manufactures? *Britain* would soon cut off their Trade to foreign Markets, and destroy their Navigation. And without Trade they would make a very wretched Figure in a revolted State. No Country bordering on the Sea can have Resources within itself sufficient to maintain its Independence against a Power, which commands the Ocean. Much less is it possible that a Country, as *North America* at present is, divided into many separate Governments, whose Interest, Religion, Provincial Laws, and the very Nature of their Climates, and Disposition of the People, are different and almost incompatible, shall ever think of changing their flourishing State and Liberty for a Sovereignty, which can't be establish'd without depriving some of them of their *Charter'd Rights*, and laying them under certain Restrictions and Inconveniencies, which lesser States are always obliged to submit unto, when they impolitically give up their Interest to the Will of a greater Power.

So that whether the *American* Colonies are sway'd by the *Love of Liberty*, or by any Motive which contributes to make them a rich and flourishing People, and to protect them in their Religion, Rights, Privileges, Commerce and Navigation, they ought not to be suspected of approach-

proaching towards a Revolution, which would bring manifest Ruin upon themselves. For, admit that each Province might continue its own Laws, and pursue its own private Interest: Such an Agreement would leave the weaker Provinces exposed to the Caprice, Ambition and Power of the stronger, when there was no Help to be expected from *Britain*. Of which the Petty States in *Italy* and *Germany*, which gradually become a Prey to their powerful and ambitious Neighbours, furnish many Examples.

On the other Side, it is the Interest of *Britain* to protect her *American* Colonies: To cover them from foreign Invasion: and to defend them from all intestine Commotions. The most effectual Way to the Conquest of a Country, which is benefited by its Colonies, has always been to dismember them. When any State has tamely look'd on, till its Colonies were conquer'd by the Enemy, it could seldom resist the Conqueror.

Should the Colonies enter into a Conspiracy against their Sovereign, or presume to act contrary to the true Intent of the Law; or should they pursue Measures to put their Colonies into a State of Offence, to fabricate Weapons of Destruction; to erect Magazines of Naval and Military Stores; to seek for unnatural Alliances; to build Ships of War; or to establish Manufactures and Trade injurious to the Manufactures and Commerce of their Mother Country; *Great Britain* might easily, and ought to interpose with her Power and Authority. The Civil Power faithfully executed, would be sufficient to disarm the Licentious, and all such as were given to Change: And Penal Laws applied to various Circumstances, would

would effectually restrain the Trade and Manufactures of the Colonies to such a Degree, as to make them subservient, useful and advantageous to their Mother Country.

Let me add, That the Letter-Writer is very unhappy in the Choice of his *Medium* for this Argument of the *American* Revolt. He fixes it upon an Increase of Arts and Sciences, of Trade and Manufactures; of Plenty and Liberty. From which Blessings we are to hope for much better Things. For, hitherto all the *Revolts* in the World proceeded from quite contrary Causes. Idleness, Ignorance, Poverty and Arbitrary Power are the Causes of Riots, Commotions, Insurrections, Rebellions and Revolts. No Collective Body of People could be prevail'd upon to risque their Lives without hopes of mending their Condition. Employment keeps the giddy Multitude in Order; they find no Time for plotting; and feel no Want. Property keeps the Rich in Awe, who are always injured by Civil Commotions. Therefore the richer, the politer, and the more industrious our Brethren grow in *North America*, they may be expected to entertain more exalted Notions of Gratitude and Loyalty to their King and Mother Country, and not only obey the Laws enacted for their good Government, Protection and Trade, but be always disposed and ready to unite with their Lives and Fortunes for the Preservation of the Constitution and Freedom of *Old England*, should it ever be in Danger of being enslav'd by Arbitrary Power, Domestic Faction, or foreign Invasion.

Thus I have considered the Reasons of the Gentleman, who dates his Letters from *Guadaloupe*, with Candour; and answer'd him with Decency,
with

with a strict Regard to Truth, and to the Subject of the Argument; and with as much Brevity and Order, as his Tautology and confused Method of Writing would admit, which has obliged me to examine a few of his Assertions here by themselves.

He argues, * “ That to prevent the *French* “ from disturbing us in that Quarter of the “ World for some Time, either we must take “ the *Mississippi*; or the Argument for *Canada*’s “ Security to the *British* Colonies in *North Ame-* “ *rica*, cannot be conclusive. For continues he, “ † granting we should drive them out of *Ca-* “ *nada* (whose Fate is still dubious ||) will not “ these People retire and take Shelter in *Mississip-* “ *pi*? From that Circumstance, will not *Mississippi* “ be more populous and more dangerous, and “ all our Apprehensions, of being driven out of “ *America*, be renewed from that Quarter.”

Does not this Gentleman see, how the Argument retorts upon himself? He has laboured thro’ thick and thin to prove it dangerous for *England* to make a Conquest of ALL *America*, and to perswade us, That leaving the *French* upon the Backs of our Colonies is the best and only Means to keep them from revolting from their Mother Country. Here, by saying that there can be no Security to the *British* Colonies, without taking of the *Mississippi*, he admits the necessity of driving the *French* entirely out of *North America*: and therefore must allow, that the taking and keeping of *Canada* (whose Fate is no longer dubious) is a wise and necessary Measure, and

* See Page 5. Line 22, &c. † Page 9. Line 20, &c.
‡ Page 5. Line 5.

and what must be done previous to the taking of the *Mississippi* also. Which Acquisition no doubt, would be an additional Security to our Southern Provinces on that Continent : because then the natural Enemy of our Liberty and Trade, could find no Shelter to disturb our Peace, in that Quarter of the World. But when we consider the little Increase of the People in that Colony, compared to those in *Canada*, and *Acadia*, whose Imbecility and Depopulation are owing to the Moisture and Heat of the Climate ; and recollect the Difficulties, to which the Trade and Navigation of the *Mississippi* are subject, by its Situation in the Gulph of *Mexico* ; where the Wind is always in the East, and a Ship is often six Weeks beating up the Bay of *Palacio* ; its Advantages to *Old France* can never be of that Consequence, as to retard the Blessings of Peace, should *Britain* insist upon its Cession also ; nor could its Operations against our Colonies be supported with any Vigour, for renewing a War in *North America*. The Inhabitants are weak, and the Communication with *Europe* is precarious. The Colonies have no Resources either of Men or Ammunition amongst themselves : And where the Climate is so unwholesome, the Winds so adverse, and the Navigation so hazardous, they can have no Dependance or Supplies from *Old France*.

In the next Place he infers, That, if the *French* will never be at Peace with us, when they cannot make War in *America*, they must disturb us in *Europe* : and then asks, Whether we have more Advantage over the *French* by a War in *America*, or a War in *Flanders*, when they have *Ostend* in their Hands, &c. ? *

Here

Here we ought to consider two Things, Has the *French* Enmity been less or more, during the Time of their Possession of *Canada* and *Acadia*? will the Loss of their Possessions in *North America* increase or diminish their Power, by which they have hitherto been able and ready to dispute the Right we claim to our Discoveries on that Continent?

If it be found, That the hostile Intentions of *France* against *Britain* have shewn themselves more, since their Strength, in *North America*, has been confirmed by the several Treaties within fifty Years, and that the Loss of their Northern Colonies on that Continent has so diminished their Power, that they are no longer in a Condition to dispute our Right: it must be granted that the *French* Power in *Europe* will be diminished; and their Hostilities in *Europe* must decrease. The grand Contention about Limits, Property and Trade in the *New World* will cease: And the Resources, which the *French* expected from their Conquests in *North America*, being cut off for ever, they will more seriously think of Peace. Therefore where it is said, That *they will never be at Peace with us*, it means no more than, The *French* will always seek an Opportunity to disturb the Peace of *Britain* and of all *Europe*, in Proportion to the Increase of their Power, and the Advantage of their Situation. Consequently the only Means to compel them to keep Peace, is to lop their encreasing Strength, and to drive them out of those advantageous Posts, from whence they shew the most Eagerness to attack their Neighbours. All which is the Object of those Measures, which have driven them out of their

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Possessions in *North* and *South America*, and other Places bordering on our Trade and Settlements.

His comparative Reasoning about a War in *America*, and a War in *Flanders*, is begging the Question. Must we permit the *French* to compel us into an *American* War; which can't be carried on with Effect, without an Expence that surpasses any before it; in order to prevent their making Conquests in *Flanders*? Or does it follow, That being driven out of *America*, they will be better able and more prone to invade *Flanders*? Or, again, is the Safety of *Flanders* a Consideration of equal Concern in the Councils of *Great Britain*, with the Protection and Security of her *American* Colonies? When we are delivered from the Incumbrances of an *American* War; the *British* Power will be greatly increased. When *France* has lost her *American* Colonies, her Power will decline, and she will no longer be able to divert the *British* Arms from those Measures, which are necessary to chastise our Enemies. We now see *Ostend* and *Newport* in the Hands of the *French*; and, tho' this is a Time for them to exert every Sinew of Power, to save their sinking Country, *Britain* has not hitherto been made sensible of any *National* Disadvantage, arising from those Ports, or even from *Minorca*, to her Safety, Trade, or Navigation.



F I N I S.

